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Abstract 
Two experiments tested the notion that considering multiple criteria for social categorization 
can reduce intergroup bias. In both experiments, participants were required to consider alternative 
ways in which people could be classified, other than an initially salient intergroup dichotomy. In 
Experiment 1 we found that generating alternative social classifications that were unrelated to an 
initial target dichotomy reduced intergroup bias compared to a control condition. In Experiment 2 
we replicated this effect and found that unrelated, but not related, categorizations were necessary to 
reduce bias. This paper adds support to the view that increasing categorical complexity is a useful 
tool in bias reduction. We discuss these findings in the context of a developing model of multiple 














Considering multiple criteria for social categorization can reduce intergroup bias  
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Processing resources are a valuable commodity for the social perceiver. For the most part, 
classifying others into broad groupings -- social categorization -- is a useful shortcut for navigating 
the social world and thus saving such resources (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Hamilton, 1979; Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2001). The usefulness of this mechanism can be demonstrated by the observation that 
it is used even in artificial and arbitrary contexts (e.g., Rabbie & Horowitz, 1969; Tajfel, 1982; 
Tajfel, Flament, Billig & Bundy, 1971; for a review see Bourhis, Sachdev, & Gagnon 1994). The 
cognitive efficacy of social categorization comes, however, with some drawbacks: it is the mental 
pre-requisite for intergroup bias. People in the perceiver’s own groups tend to be reliably and 
consistently evaluated more positively than those in other groups (e.g., Brewer, 1979, Mullen, 
Brown & Smith, 1992). In this article, we explore the potential for reducing such bias by 
contravening the inherent ‘functionality’ of categorization. 
The usefulness of social categorization 
Categorization causes an accentuation of differences between, and similarities within, social 
groups (Doise, 1978; McGarty & Penny, 1988; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). According to many theorists, 
it is this process of differentiation between groups that, in part, leads to ingroup favouritism (for 
examples see the Category Differentiation Model, Doise, 1978; Social Identity Theory, Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979; Self-Categorization Theory, Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherall, 1987). There 
are differences between these accounts. For some categorization is a simplifying mechanism, for 
others a way of ascribing meaning to the social context, but they all rest on the notion that to 
observe intergroup bias there must first exist a distinct cognitive dichotomization into ‘us’ and 
‘them’ (see Maass & Schaller, 1989; Tajfel, 1969), and they are all linked by a common principle: 
that categorization is on some level psychologically ‘useful’.  
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Social categorization can be considered useful because it is adaptive, providing a quick and 
sufficient understanding of what is occurring in the social world (van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 
2000). Group-based judgments represent a slice of knowledge that can be applied to a target person 
who fits the category (e.g., Sherman, Macrae, & Bodenhausen, 2000). Categorical thinking is 
cognitively economical -- providing the maximum output of information with the least cognitive 
effort (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001). It reduces the need to process incoming data by providing the 
perceiver with group-based expectancies; and directs attention and processing resources to 
expectancy relevant information (Hastie, 1981; Stangor & Macmillian, 1992). Using social categories 
to guide processing therefore reduces the cognitive resources required for person perception by 
providing a set of pre-conceived expectations about the target (Bodenhausen, 1992; Macrae, Stangor 
& Milne, 1994; Oakes & Turner, 1990).  
Although categorical thinking can be advantageous from this functional perspective, 
stereotypes associated with category activation are often inaccurate when applied to individual 
targets. Furthermore, such activated social categories can cause selective perception, interpretation, 
and memory (Heilman, 1995). This can be problematic when the (sometimes negative) stereotypic 
information generated is used to guide impression formation. The question we addressed in this 
research was whether removing the cognitive efficacy of categorization would prevent its use in 
guiding evaluative judgments in person perception. We suggest that one way to achieve this is by 
making multiple alternative bases for social categorization salient for the perceiver. 
Multiple social categorization 
A considerable amount of work has focused on the notion that changing the categorical 
representation of groups can correspondingly change intergroup evaluations. Levine and Campbell 
(1972) drew attention to the reduced conflict associated with cultures having a crossed societal 
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structure. They noted that in contexts characterized by social structures that comprise loyalties to 
multiple groups, some of which coincide, and some of which are in conflict, lower levels of 
intergroup conflict tend to be observed. Later, this idea emerged in social psychological work on 
intergroup relations. Deschamps and Doise (1978) suggested that by simultaneously combining two 
cross-cutting dimensions of social categorization, opposing accentuation and assimilation principles 
would effectively cancel each other out and reduce intergroup bias. This approach of combining two 
cross-cutting categorizations has met with mixed success in terms of reducing intergroup bias 
(Brown & Turner, 1979; Crisp, Hewstone, & Rubin, 2001; Deschamps & Doise, 1978; 
Vanbeselaere, 1987; 1996). The majority of studies produce a pattern of evaluation where any group 
associated with the ingroup is evaluated positively to some extent, but where negative evaluations 
are still directed towards those people who are outgroup according to both categorical criteria 
(Diehl, 1990; Ensari & Miller, 1998; Hewstone, Islam & Judd, 1993; Kenworthy, Canales, Weaver, 
& Miller, 2003; Marcus-Newhall, Miller, Holtz & Brewer, 1993; Urada & Miller, 2000; 
Vanbeselaere, 1987; see Crisp & Hewstone, 1999; Urban & Miller, 1999 for reviews).  
In contrast to focusing participants on two cross-cutting dimensions of categorization 
(Deschamps & Doise, 1978; Vanbeselaere, 1987; 1996), considering more than two categorization 
criteria may uniquely lead to a ‘decategorization’ effect (Crisp et al., 2001). The reasoning is as 
follows: we know that participants are cognitively able to use two dimensions of social 
categorization under normal processing conditions (e.g., Vanbeselaere, 1987). As the number of 
categorization dimensions to consider increases, the intergroup context would become much more 
complex and the perceiver may no longer be able to easily determine on what basis they are similar 
to, or different from, the target person. There may be too many dimensions of membership to allow 
meaningful category conjunctions to form. Perceivers may be able to cognitively combine categories 
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like ‘single mother’ or ‘working parent’ (see Hutter & Crisp, in press), but they may find, for 
example, ‘single, black, educated, working mother’ more difficult, at least with respect to gaining 
any added value by processing information and making evaluative judgments heuristically. There 
may come a point in considering successive categorical dimensions when using a heuristic method of 
classification actually becomes inefficient relative to other methods of impression formation. The 
idea of multiple modes of processing is key to contemporary theories of person perception, and we 
suggest that the ideas outlined above regarding the effects of multiple categorization can be 
interpreted within the context of some well-established frameworks relating to impression 
formation. 
Categorization and decategorization 
Brewer’s (1988) Dual Process Theory and Fiske and Neuberg’s (1990) Continuum Model 
both consider person perception and impression formation to comprise of two distinct processes: 
categorization and individuation. The basic premise of Brewer’s Dual Process Theory (1988) is that 
either a top-down category based approach or a bottom-up person based approach is used and this is 
analogous to a heuristic (category) versus systematic (individuated) approach to person perception. 
Fiske and Neuberg (1990) propose a continuum for impression formation where one extremity is 
category-based processing and the other is attribute (individuated) based processing. On this 
continuum people can be perceived as a representative of a group (category-based responding), or as 
an individual separate from any categorical identity (attribute-based responding). Fiske and Neuberg 
propose a system where an initial categorization will occur, followed by a confirmatory process to 
determine how good a fit there is between the category and target. If this is unsuccessful, then there 
will be a shift towards the individuated mode of perception by invoking an attribute-by-attribute 
approach to form an impression of the target person. As Fiske, Lin and Neuberg  (1999) state: 
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“...perceivers typically use category-oriented processes before they use attribute-orientated processes, 
and [that] if the category-oriented processes work well enough perceivers do not engage additional 
more attribute oriented processes” (pp. 236). Brewers’ Dual Process Theory is based on similar 
principles and predicts that the mode of perception will change from the use of category based 
heuristics to a more systematic individuated mode of perception under conditions that either favor, 
or do not favor, one over the other. As Brewer and Harasty Feinstein (1999) note, the changes in 
processing outlined by the Dual Process Model map directly onto Fiske and Neuberg’s impression 
formation continuum.  
This switch in processing from using categorization to individuation can be termed 
decategorization. Decategorization results when initial categorizations of people as group members 
are overridden by a more comprehensive and differentiated perception of the individual (see Brewer 
& Miller, 1984; Ensari & Milller, 2001; Wilder, 1986). Once decategorization has occurred the target 
person should be primarily defined as an individual rather than a group member, which should 
remove category-based bias. Previous research has found that conditions that promote 
decategorization will encourage participants to favour the ingroup less (presumably because the 
judgment is being made on an appreciation of personal merit, not on the basis of pre-conceived 
categorical expectancies; see Brewer & Miller, 1984; Krueger &  Rothbart, 1988; Miller & 
Harrington, 1992). This change in the mode of processing should also allow the perceiver to develop 
a more personalized and less homogenous perception of ingroup and outgroup members (Ensari & 
Miller, 2001; Fiske & Neuberg, 1989).  
We argue that considering multiple criteria for social categorization could produce a 
decategorization effect by virtue of the implied decrease in usefulness of any one dimension of social 
comparison. Decategorization is, however, an uncommon finding when only two dimensions of 
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categorization are combined. Ensari and Miller (2001) directly compared personalized contact 
(where participants are asked to consider unique attributes) with the traditional crossed 
categorization approach (two dimensions of categorization). They found that intergroup bias was no 
longer moderated by shared ingroup memberships in the personalised contact condition, but this 
was not the case in the crossed categorization condition. This could be because participants are quite 
able (and appear to) consider two social categorizations simultaneously in memory and use them to 
guide evaluative judgments (Vanbeselaere, 1987; 1996).  
However, as the number of category dimensions that need to be processed simultaneously 
increases then it may be that categorization, as a functional heuristic, becomes relatively inefficient, 
leading to a shift in orientation and a reduction in bias as outlined by Brewer’s (1988) and Fiske and 
Neuberg’s (1990) models. If perceivers experience conditions in which categorization becomes too 
complex to be functional then they may resort to a more individuated strategy for person 
perception. Correspondingly they should be less biased in their evaluations of ingroup and outgroup 
members, as these evaluations are no longer tied to group membership. By considering multiple 
criteria for social categorization, category-oriented processes may no longer provide the most 
functionally efficient or meaningful way of making judgments, and consequently perceivers may 
resort to a less biased approach to person perception.  
In the context of the dual processing accounts of impression formation outlined above, we 
can make some clear predictions with respect to the effects of multiple categorization on intergroup 
evaluations. We thus tested the possibility that merely thinking about multiple alternative criteria 
for social categorization may decategorize person perception and reduce category-based ingroup 
favoritism.  
Pilot study 
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We initially carried out a pilot study to develop our multiple categorization task. We focused 
on undergraduate students’ own university group membership versus a local rival university. Forty-
five undergraduate psychology students took part in individual sessions.  All participants were 
informed that they would be asked to think about people who shared their university membership 
and people who did not.  They were advised that the study was concerned with perceptions of 
people at different universities and how their respective qualities influence creativity and originality 
in working environments, and that all information would be compiled to assess the skills and 
abilities from graduates at different universities.  Participants first completed a task that was 
ostensibly designed to test creativity, originality, and artistic merit. They were provided with a 
square piece of paper and asked to make a model that represented something in the real world by 
folding or tearing. They were allowed five minutes to complete this task. Participants in the 
experimental condition were then given the following instructions that constituted the critical task 
variable manipulation: “On an earlier page we asked you to think about your university affiliation. 
This is one possible way that people can define themselves, but there are many more. People can be 
similar or different from others not just according to one criterion, but often there are many and 
varied ways that people define themselves and others. We would like you to think of other groups 
that university students can use to define themselves (in addition to what university they are at)”.  
They were asked to provide a few written lines of elaboration on each alternative they came 
up with to reinforce the manipulation. They then completed a measure of group evaluation. 
Participants in the control condition did not complete a categorization task.  Instead, they 
completed the group evaluations directly after making their paper model and received none of the 
instructions outlined above. 
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Evaluations were measured by participants rating two paper models supposedly made by 
previous ingroup and outgroup participants
1
. Participants were asked to rate an ingrouper’s and 
outgrouper’s paper model according to creativity, originality and artistic merit on scales ranging 
from 0 (not at all) to 9 (very much so). These items were averaged to form indices of group 
evaluation: ingroup =.721, outgroup =.722. The group to which the model was affiliated and the 
order in which the models were presented was counterbalanced across conditions.  
A 2 (task: control vs. multiple alternatives) x 2 (target: ingroup vs. outgroup) mixed 
ANOVA with repeated measures on second factor revealed a significant interaction between task 
and target F (1, 43) = 4.77, p = .035.  This interaction reflected significant variation in intergroup 
bias (ingroup minus outgroup evaluations) as a function of task instructions, although not in the 
expected direction. Compared to the control condition (M= -.300), intergroup bias was increased 
following the generation of multiple alternatives (M = .707)
2
. 
To investigate why we did not obtain the predicted reduction in bias we examined the 
specific alternative classifications generated by our participants in the experimental condition. We 
found that the majority of participants who completed the multiple categorization task (78%) had 
actually produced classifications that were related in some way to the initial target dichotomy, rather 
than unrelated alternative ways of classifying the student groups. We define related category 
dimensions as those that are conceptually linked with the target categories. For example, what 
academic subject [major] is being studied is related to the context within which the target intergroup 
dichotomy (in this case ‘students’) is embedded. In contrast, unrelated category dimensions are those 
that are not conceptually linked with the target categories. For example, in our studies ‘nationality’ 
is unrelated to being a student. In this pilot study most participants had generated category 
dimensions like ‘subject [major] studied’ or ‘hall or residence [fraternity/sorority]’ as their 
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alternative criteria. These alternatives are, however, directly related to the dimension ‘student 
affiliation’. Few participants generated alternatives that were (as we had intended) unrelated to the 
target intergroup context (e.g., ‘gender’ or ‘place of birth’). Interestingly, closer examination of the 
participants who had generated unrelated criteria did show a trend in the predicted direction 
(reduced bias).  
We hypothesized that generation of related alternatives may not undermine the usefulness of 
the target dichotomy. Our reasoning was as follows. We know from previous work that whilst 
making a superordinate categorization salient can sometimes reduce intergroup bias (Gaertner & 
Dovido, 2000), sometimes it can be ineffective, or even increase bias (see Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). In 
their Ingroup Projection Model Mummendy and Wenzel (1999) draw upon Self-Categorization 
Theory (Turner, 1981; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Weatherall, 1987) to argue that making a 
superordinate categorization salient can accentuate intergroup bias by introducing a relevant basis 
for social comparison. For example, fans of opposing sports teams may not be concerned with 
making ingroup favoring social comparisons against some other team until a relevant superordinate 
dimension is salient (i.e., they become rivals within the same league or competition).  
We argue that the generation of related alternative categorizations may have similar effects. 
Thinking of related categorizations, by definition, should prime a relevant superordinate category 
dimension (‘students’) along which to compare the initial ingroup and outgroup student subgroups 
(defined by university affiliation). For example, categories related to university affiliation such as 
fraternity or sorority, or major studied, all make the superordinate category ‘students’ more salient 
and relevant. Put another way, thinking about bases for categorization other than the target 
dichotomy, but nonetheless related to it, creates a context of comparability in which ingroup 
favoring evaluations can serve to positively differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup (Tajfel & 
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Turner, 1979; see also Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Jetten, Spears & Manstead, 1996; 2001). Generation of 
related alternatives reinforces any potential comparability between the ingroup and outgroup, thus, 
ingroup favoritism should at best, remain pervasive, and at worse increase. 
This pilot study therefore established an important pre-condition for the generation of 
multiple alternative classifications to reduce intergroup bias. To avoid priming a superordinate 
context of comparison as outlined above, it would be important to specify the generation of 
unrelated alternatives. In our first experiment, we therefore modified our instructions to achieve this 
goal. 
Experiment 1 
In this experiment the multiple categorization task instructions used in the pilot study were 
adapted to encourage participants to generate unrelated, not related, alternatives. We predicted that 
relative to a control condition, generation of unrelated alternatives would result in a decrease in 
intergroup bias. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Thirty-eight undergraduate psychology students (31 females, 7 males, with an overall mean 
age of 19) were randomly allocated to a 2 (task: control vs. multiple unrelated alternatives) x 2 
(target: ingroup vs. outgroup) mixed design with repeated measures on the second factor. 
Participants received course credit for their involvement. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to the pilot study except that after having created the paper 
models, participants were given the multiple categorization instructions outlined above with the 
addition of an explicit instruction not to generate related alternatives (the student subgroups ‘subject 
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studied ’ and ‘hall of residence’ were given as examples of alternatives to avoid). Participants were 
asked instead to generate “alternative ways people can vary independent from being a student”, with 
the example given of ‘Nationality’. 
Participants in the control condition did not carry out the multiple categorization task and 
simply completed the evaluative measures (the typical baseline condition used in bias-reduction 
research) using the same paper models as employed in the pilot study. 
Dependant Measures  
Evaluations were measured by participants rating two paper models for creativity on a scale 
ranging from 0 (not at all) to 9 (very much so)
3
. One of the models ostensibly belonged to an 
ingroup member and one ostensibly belonging to an outgroup member. The group to which the 
model was affiliated and the order in which the models were presented was counterbalanced across 
conditions. 
Results & discussion 
One participant did not fully complete the dependant measures so was excluded from all 
further analysis. Four participants were removed on the grounds that they were suspicious about the 
aims of the experiment. Despite the refined multiple categorization instructions one participant 
exclusively produced related classifications so they were also excluded leaving an N of 32, with the 
remaining participants evenly distributed across conditions. Means and standard deviations can be 
found in Table 1. 
Manipulation check 
The categories generated by participants in the unrelated alternatives condition were judged 
for relatedness by two independent raters blind to the experimental hypotheses (participants in the 
control condition did not produce any categories). The judges were asked to rate the five category 
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dimensions produced by each participant on a seven point scale as to whether they were unrelated 
(anchored at 1) or related (anchored at 7) to the initial target category dimension (student affiliation). 
Judges were provided with an example to clarify this distinction. An example of an unrelated 
category was ‘hair color’, an example of a related category was ‘subject studied’.  The two blind 
coders’ ratings had acceptable inter-rater reliability, r = .688, p =.002, (MJudge 1 = 1.41, SDJudge 1 = .618 
vs. MJudge 2 = 2.12, SDJudge 2 = 1.50) so were collapsed into one scale (by taking the mean of the two 
judges’ ratings). A one sample t-test against the scale midpoint (4) revealed that on aggregate 
participants in the experimental condition had produced category dimensions that were unrelated to 
the target dimension of comparison (‘students’), t (16) = -9.35, p < .0005 (M = 1.76, SD = .986). 
Evaluations 
A 2 (task) x 2 (target) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor revealed no 
main effect of target, F (1, 30) = .868, p = .359, nor of task, F (1, 30) = 2.41, p = .131. There was, 
however, the predicted interaction between task and target, F (1, 30) = 7.57, p =.010. In line with 
expectations, intergroup bias (ingroup minus outgroup evaluations) was lower following the 
generation of multiple unrelated alternative categorizations (M = -.083) compared to the control 
condition (M = 1.67)
4
. 
In summary, in line with predictions, intergroup bias was reduced following the generation of 
multiple unrelated categorizations compared to the control condition. The effect appeared to be 
driven predominantly by lowered ingroup evaluations, although some (non-significant) variation in 
outgroup evaluations was also observed. We know that intergroup bias is driven primarily by 
accentuated ingroup evaluations rather than outgroup derogation (Brewer, 1979). As such, reduced 
reliance on social categorization should, as we observed, result in a decrease in this ingroup 
favoritism (which is driving the bias in the first place), rather than a decrease in outgroup 
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derogation. In Experiment 2 we sought to replicate and expand on these findings by directly 
comparing the effects of generating related versus unrelated alternative bases for categorization. 
Experiment 2 
 
Our pilot work indicated that thinking about related alternative classifications had a 
detrimental effect on intergroup relations, yet, we did not experimentally test this in Experiment 1. 
In Experiment 2 we therefore directly compared the two ways of framing the task. We had decided 
to use only a single-item evaluative measure in Experiment 1 so we expanded this to a three-item 
measure in this experiment. We expected reduced intergroup bias only for participants who were 
instructed to generate unrelated alternatives, compared to a control condition and a condition in 
which participants generated related alternatives.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
Fifty-eight undergraduate psychology students (56 females; 2 males with a mean age of 19) 
were randomly allocated to a 3 (task: control vs. multiple unrelated alternatives vs. multiple related 
alternatives) x 2 (target: ingroup vs. outgroup) mixed design with repeated measures on the second 




The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 except we added a related alternatives 
condition. This version of the multiple categorization task comprised the same core instructions 
used in the pilot study but instead of the addition of an explicit instruction not to generate related 
alternatives, participants were specifically instructed to generate related alternatives (the student 
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subgroups ‘subject area’ and ‘hall of residence’ were given as examples of alternatives to use). The 
‘unrelated’ task was identical to that used in Experiment 1. 
Dependent measures 
Participants were asked to rate the ingroup and outgroup paper models according to 
creativity, originality and artistic merit on scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 9 (very much so). 
These items were averaged to form indices of ingroup ( = .762) and outgroup ( = .810) evaluation 
respectively. 
Results & discussion 
Three participants were removed because they reported suspicion about the aims of the 
experiment, leaving an N of 55. Means and standard deviations for all measures can be found in 
Table 2. 
Manipulation check 
The categories generated by participants in the related and unrelated alternatives conditions 
were judged by the same two independent raters, blind to condition, as described in Experiment 1. 
We also used the same ‘relatedness’ scale for judging participants’ responses as used in Experiment 1. 
The ratings produced by the two blind coders had acceptable inter-rater reliability, r = .905, p < 
.001 (unrelated: MJudge 1 = 1.20, SDJudge 1 = .696 vs. MJudge 2 = 1.85, SDJudge 2 = 1.18, related: MJudge 1 = 
4.44, SDJudge 1 = 1.58 vs. MJudge 2 = 5.56, SDJudge 2 = 1.89) so were collapsed (by taking the mean) into 
one index. On this relatedness index, a t-test revealed a significant difference between related and 
unrelated conditions in the expected direction, t (36) = -8.30, p < .0005, (Munrelated = 1.52 vs. Mrelated = 
5.00). Participants in the related condition generated categories that were more related to the student 
superordinate category context than those in the unrelated condition. One sample t-tests were 
carried out against the midpoint of the scale. Those in the related condition produced categories that 
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were judged to be significantly related to the superordinate context, t (17) = 2.58 p = .020. In 
contrast, those in the unrelated condition produced categories that were judged to be significantly 
unrelated to the superordinate context, t (19) = -13.01, p < .0005. 
Evaluations 
A 3 (task) x 2 (target) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor revealed 
no main effect of target, F (1, 52) = .004, p = .950, nor of task, F (1, 52) = .261, p = .771. There was, 
however, the expected significant interaction between task and target, F (2, 52) = 3.84, p = .028.
5
 To 
explore the observed interaction, we again created an index of intergroup bias (ingroup minus 
outgroup evaluations).  Consistent with the findings from Experiment 1, planned comparisons 
revealed less intergroup bias in the unrelated alternatives condition than in the control condition, t 
(52) = 2.23 p = .030 (Mcontrol = .249, vs. Munrelated = -.650). There was also less intergroup bias in the 
unrelated alternatives condition compared to the related alternatives condition, t (52) = 2.49, p = 
.016 (Munrelated = -.650, vs. Mrelated = .338). Finally, there was no difference in intergroup bias between 
the control and the related alternatives condition, t (52) = -.219, p = .828, (Mcontrol = .249, vs. Mrelated 
= .338). 
To summarize, in Experiment 2 we supported the idea that merely thinking about multiple 
alternative categorizations can reduce intergroup bias -- as long as they are unrelated to the initial 
intergroup context.  
General Discussion 
The aim of these experiments was to see if considering multiple alternative categorizations to 
the target ingroup versus outgroup categorization could reduce intergroup bias. In Experiment 1 we 
found that the generation of multiple unrelated alternatives led to the predicted bias-reduction 
effect. Experiment 2 built on these findings by replicating the decrease in intergroup bias following 
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generation of multiple unrelated, but not related, categorization criteria. Overall, these studies have 
developed and refined a new approach to bias-reduction that is consistent with extant theoretical 
and empirical work on dual processing accounts of impression formation.  
 
Multiple alternatives and decategorization 
In Experiments 1 and 2 we found that the generation of multiple criteria for social 
categorization that were unrelated to the superordinate category comparison context ‘students’ 
reduced intergroup bias. The findings are consistent with the suggestion that the generation of 
multiple alternatives can encourage a shift in judgment orientation: if categorization is no longer 
functional in such contexts then judgments become less category-based (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990), reducing ingroup favoritism. 
There is an important caveat to this approach. Although the generation of multiple 
categories can reduce ingroup favoritism, it will only do so if the categories generated are unrelated 
to the superordinate category context. We believe that this is a crucial prerequisite for ensuring the 
success of multiple categorization approaches that aim to achieve decategorization. The generation 
of related categories may emphasize ingroup and outgroup comparability by highlighting the 
superordinate category context. Correspondingly, this may have no bias-reducing effect, or even 
result in a reactive increase in intergroup bias.  
There are a number of potential explanations for what might cause the observed reduction in 
bias. We have argued that the generation of multiple categories may undermine the utility of the 
initial dichotomy and hence prevent the application of stereotypes relating to initial ingroups and 
outgroups.  It is also possible, however, that producing numerous categorizations may reduce bias 
along the specified ingroup-outgroup categorization by reducing the degree to which the categorical 
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distinction is salient for the perceiver. The decategorization effect may also be caused by a dilution 
of the original groups and their associated characteristics with many other categorizations and their 
stereotypes.  The aim of the current research was to establish whether generation of multiple 
alternative categorizations can lead to a reduction in bias. Having now established this, more 
research is needed to delineate precisely the mechanisms that underlie this effect. 
We should acknowledge that some aspects of our findings should be considered tentative. We 
have demonstrated the effect on only one dependent measure and with one paradigm thus, it is 
necessary for future work to test generalizability of the findings. In addition, while the general 
pattern of the findings across studies is consistent with predictions, there are also a number of 
specific inconsistencies across the three studies (relating to whether the locus of effect resides in 
moderation of ingroup evaluations, outgroup evaluations, or both). This further strengthens the call 
for replication with other procedures and measures. 
Category complexity and ingroup projection 
The multiple categorization approach used in this research may relate to the Ingroup 
Projection Model, Mummendy and Wenzel (1999). This model builds upon Self-Categorization 
Theory (Turner, 1981; Turner et al., 1987) to argue that superordinate categorization creates a 
context of comparability between ingroup and outgroup subgroups. Mummendey and Wenzel argue 
that in intergroup situations where the superordinate group is salient, the ingroup prototype will be 
projected on to the superordinate group.  This ingroup projection may cause the outgroup to be 
perceived more negatively. If both the ingroup and outgroup are conceptualized as part of a 
superordinate category (a relevant comparison context), and the ingroup prototype has been 
projected onto the superordinate category, then the outgroup will be seen as deviating from the 
norm (Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003). The ingroup projected prototype will 
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invariably be positive and hence the outgroup will be judged less positively by comparison (Wenzel, 
2001).  We argue that the generation of category dimensions related to the target dichotomy primes 
the superordinate categorization context, making the ingroup and outgroup similarly comparable. 
In contrast, generating unrelated alternatives reduces bias because it creates a context in which the 
utility of categorization per se is reduced – the context becomes too complex to usefully employ 
social categories. 
Interestingly, the notion that category complexity can reduce intergroup bias is also reflected 
in the Ingroup Projection Model. Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, and Weber (2003) found that 
projection of the ingroup prototype does not occur when the superordinate category is perceived 
itself as having a complex prototype. Although we argue that generating unrelated alternatives 
should lead to categorization being abandoned as a means of structuring social perception (so should 
not invoke the superordinate category), there are clear parallels between our model and the Ingroup 
Projection Model, in that both argue that complexity can reduce intergroup bias. Indeed, the notion 
that complexity is a good thing for intergroup relations is emerging as a key theme in work on 
intergroup relations. Roccas and Brewer’s (2002) model of Social Identity Complexity argues that 
the more complex a perceiver’s social identity, and the less overlap there is between their multiple 
ingroup identities, the less ingroup favoritism should be observed. Although not specific to 
ingroups, our research supports this general concept. 
The findings we report reiterate the message that multiple categorization can reduce 
intergroup bias. Future research could examine some interesting possibilities regarding the 
integration of multiple categorization and ingroup projection via notions of complexity, and the 
corresponding potential for developing effective interventions to reduce intergroup bias. 
Conclusions 
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The aim of this research was to explore the potential for multiple social categorization to 
reduce intergroup bias. Could merely thinking about multiple alternative bases for social 
categorization be an effective strategy for promoting more egalitarianism in person perception? On 
the basis of these findings, we argue that the answer is yes -- but with one important caveat. The way 
in which people are asked to consider multiple alternative criteria is critical to the observed effects. 
We found that categorization no longer defined evaluative judgment following multiple 
categorization providing that the categories considered were not related to the superordinate 
category context. These findings provide some important links between diverse literatures in 
impression formation and person perception, but perhaps more importantly, may also go some way 
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The dependent measures and models used were extensively pre-tested. The two models presented 
were of a boat and a crown. These were originally made in a pre-testing session with a group of 
students. Participants were informed that for the purposes of the pre-test the models would be 
referred to as ‘model 1’ and ‘model 2’. Participants were required to rate model 1 and model 2 in 
terms of originality, creativity and artistic merit. For the boat; originality t (13) = .069, p = 0.95, 
creativity t (13) = -.623, p = .544, and artistic merit t (13) = .203, p = .842. For the crown; 
originality t (13) =.648, p =.528, creativity t (13) = 1.27, p =.226 and artistic merit t (13) = 1.72, p = 
.110. Which model was presented first as ‘model 1’ was counterbalanced across participants. The 
order of presentation of the models in the pre-test had no effect on participants’ ratings of 
originality, creativity or artistic merit for either model. We combined the three scales into one 
overall measure for each model (boat Cronbach’s = .705; crown Cronbach’s =.655). When no 
reference was made to ingroup or outgroup affiliation of the person who made the model, both 
models were perceived to be equally positive, t (14) = -1.20, p = .251. We thus used these models 
and the three evaluative items in the subsequent experiment.  
2 
 One way t-tests were also computed against the scale midpoint of 0 (which would indicate no 
bias). There was no evidence of bias in the control condition, t (19) = -.933, p = .363, but there was 
significant ingroup favoritism in the multiple alternatives condition, t (24) = -2.19, p = .038.  
3
 We decided to use only the most task-relevant item from the pilot evaluative measure here to 
provide the simplest test of our hypotheses. An additional pre-test was carried out to check that this 
‘creativity’ item could indeed be considered a measure of positive evaluation. Fifteen participants 
were simply asked to rate the concept of creativity for valence on a scale anchored with negative at -
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5, with neutral at 0 and with positive at +5. Creativity was significantly perceived to be positive 
compared to the neutral midpoint: t (14) = 8.12, p < .001, (M= 3.53).  
4
Although there appears to be outgroup favoritism in the multiple unrelated alternatives condition, 
this is evidently more attributable to the lowering of ingroup evaluations than to an increase in 
outgroup evaluations. 
5
 The analysis was also computed just on the creativity item and revealed exactly the same pattern, F 
(1, 52) = 2.91, p = .063. 
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Table 1.  
 
Evaluations as a function of categorization (Experiment 1). 
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Note: Higher numbers indicate more favourable evaluations for ingroup and outgroup evaluations, 
but for intergroup bias higher numbers indicate more ingroup favoring bias. Standard deviations are 























































Note: Higher numbers indicate more favourable evaluations for ingroup and outgroup evaluations 
but for intergroup bias higher numbers indicate more ingroup favoring bias. Standard deviations are 
shown in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
